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Spoof Detection in Optical Fingerprint Sensors Using Light Scattering 
 
Abstract: 
This publication describes methods, techniques, and apparatuses, implemented on a 
computing device, directed at detecting spoof fingerprints.  In aspects, the addition of a quarter-
wave polarizer above an optical fingerprint sensor, along with the utilization of a machine-learned 
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Background:  
Biometric recognition services provide computing device users personalized and 
convenient means by which to authenticate themselves and access their device.  Fingerprint 
scanning, in particular, is a well-known and widely used service that enables quick and reliable 
user authentication on computing devices.  The operations of this service, though often enigmatic 
to users, rely on fundamental principles of light and photography. 
Figure 1, below, illustrates the standard implementation of optical fingerprint sensors in 
computing devices. 
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 Figure 1 
As illustrated, the optical fingerprint sensor is situated beneath a collimator, an organic 
light-emitting diode (OLED) layer, a quarter-wave polarizer, and a linear polarizer.  Altogether, 
these components are housed under a display cover glass.  Computing devices (e.g., smartphones, 
laptops) may implement optical fingerprint sensors utilizing such a configuration.  
During fingerprint authentication, computing devices may require users to place their 
finger on or above the display cover glass.  In response, the OLED layer can illuminate the finger 
to capture a fingerprint image.  Light incident at the skin surface experiences both reflection and 
scattering.  The reflected light maintains identical polarization as the incident light, while the 
scattered light partially depolarizes.  Utilizing the reflected light, the optical fingerprint sensor 
reconstructs an image of the fingerprint.  A fingerprint matcher algorithm (e.g., an algorithm 
developed to compare biometric identifiers in fingerprints) is then utilized to compare the 
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fingerprint to the enrolled fingerprint (e.g., the fingerprint captured when security protocols were 
first initialized) and authenticate the user. 
Unfortunately, optical fingerprint sensors are vulnerable to spoof fingerprints: fingerprints 
that are replicas of authentic fingerprints.  For example, an unauthorized user may acquire a user’s 
fingerprints, digitize the lifted fingerprints, post-process them, and print them (e.g., two-
dimensional images or three-dimensional molds) to fool a fingerprint sensor and gain access to the 
user’s computing device.  As a result, fingerprint spoofs pose serious security and privacy 
concerns. 
Therefore, it is desirable to identify fingerprint spoofs and reject unauthorized users.  To 
this end, the addition of a quarter-wave polarizer above an optical fingerprint sensor, along with 
the utilization of a machine-learned algorithm, can enable a computing device to distinguish a 
spoof fingerprint from an authentic fingerprint. 
 
Description: 
This publication describes methods, techniques, and apparatuses, implemented on a 
computing device, directed at detecting spoof fingerprints.  In aspects, the addition of a quarter-
wave polarizer above an optical fingerprint sensor, along with the utilization of a machine-learned 
algorithm, can enable a computing device to distinguish a spoof fingerprint from an authentic 
fingerprint. 
Figure 2, below, illustrates an additional quarter-wave polarizer implemented above an 
optical fingerprint sensor. 
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 Figure 2 
As illustrated, the optical fingerprint sensor is situated beneath a collimator, an OLED 
layer, a quarter-wave polarizer, a linear polarizer, and an additional quarter-wave polarizer.  
Altogether, these components are housed under a display cover glass.  
During fingerprint authentication, a computing device (e.g., smartphone, laptop) may 
require a user to place a finger on or above the display cover glass.  In response, the OLED layer 
can illuminate the finger to capture a fingerprint image.  Light incident at the skin surface 
experiences both reflection and scattering.  The reflected light maintains identical polarization as 
the incident light, while the scattered light partially depolarizes.  Due to the polarization of the 
reflected light, the additional quarter-wave polarizer obstructs the reflected light. 
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The addition of one or more quarter-wave polarizers above an optical fingerprint sensor 
are configurable in a variety of patterns.  Figure 3A and 3B, below, illustrate just two patterns that 
the additional quarter-wave polarizer(s) may be configured. 
 
Figure 3A                       Figure 3B 
As illustrated, Figure 3A depicts only one quarter-wave polarizer above an optical 
fingerprint sensor.  Figure 3B, on the other hand, depicts four quarter-wave polarizers patterned in 
a two-by-two grid and all located in the same vertical layer above an optical fingerprint sensor.  
In any configuration, no quarter-wave polarizer extends the full length of the sensing 
region.  As a result, the optical fingerprint sensor detects reflected light where a quarter-wave 
polarizer is absent (reflected image capture region) and detects scattered light where a quarter-
wave polarizer is present (scatter image capture region). 
Figure 4 illustrates both an authentic fingerprint and a spoof fingerprint captured by an 
optical fingerprint sensor utilizing the configuration as depicted in Figure 3A. 
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 Figure 4 
In the examples illustrated in Figure 4, an optical fingerprint sensor captured two 
fingerprints with identical biometric identifiers.  The optical fingerprint sensor utilized the same 
quarter-wave polarizer configuration as depicted in Figure 3A.  
For both the authentic and the spoof fingerprint, the optical fingerprint sensor detected 
reflected light where the quarter-wave polarizer was absent, and as a result, reconstructed portions 
of the fingerprint using the reflected light (reflected image).  In addition, the optical fingerprint 
sensor detected scattered light where the quarter-wave polarizer was present, and as a result, 
reconstructed portions of the fingerprint using the scattered light (scattered image).  Using both 
images, the optical fingerprint sensor reconstructed a full fingerprint image for both the authentic 
and the spoof fingerprint.  
As illustrated in the examples of Figure 4, both fingerprint images are identical insofar as 
the reflected image is concerned.  The scattered image, however, is noticeably dissimilar between 
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the two fingerprints.  For example, the scattered image for a spoof fingerprint may appear clear, 
focused, and/or vivid.  In contrast, the scattered image for an authentic fingerprint may appear 
blurry, unfocused, and/or fuzzy.  The differences in the scattered images are due to the inherent 
properties of a presented finger.  For example, two-dimensional, printed spoof fingerprints exhibit 
uniform light scattering, while authentic fingerprints exhibit non-uniform light scattering.  Since 
three-dimensional fingers with ridges and valleys generate authentic fingerprints, the scattered 
light appears non-uniform.  
In addition to the above descriptions, portions of the collimator underneath a quarter-wave 
polarizer can be removed to permit greater scattered light detection.  By so doing, characteristics 
of authentic and spoof fingerprints in the scattered image can be magnified further.  Moreover, the 
reflected image capture region and the scattered image capture region can contain sensing circuitry 
of varying gains to amplify the scattered image.  As a result, discrepancies between the scattered 
image of an authentic fingerprint and a spoof fingerprint can be magnified.  
Finally, through the utilization of an on-device, machine-learned algorithm (anti-spoof 
detection algorithm), spoof fingerprints can be identified and rejected.  In more detail, the anti-
spoof detection algorithm may be a standard neural-network-based model with corresponding 
layers required for processing input features (e.g., fixed-side vectors, text embeddings, variable-
length sequences).  The anti-spoof detection algorithm may be implemented as one or more of a 
support vector machine (SVM), a recurrent neural network (RNN), a convolutional neural network 
(CNN), a dense neural network (DNN), one or more heuristics, other machine-learning techniques, 
a combination thereof, and so forth. 
The anti-spoof detection algorithm may be trained off-device using a triplet loss machine-
learned approach.  For example, the anti-spoof detection algorithm may be trained by comparing 
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anchor images (e.g., scattered images extracted from enrolled fingerprint images) to positive 
images (e.g., scattered images extracted from authentic fingerprint images) and negative images 
(e.g., scattered images extracted from spoof fingerprint images).  By minimizing the distance (e.g., 
Euclidean distance) between the anchor images and the positive images, and simultaneously 
maximizing the distance between the anchor images and the negative images, the anti-spoof 
detection algorithm can learn to distinguish spoof fingerprints from authentic fingerprints.  After 
sufficient training, the anti-spoof detection algorithm can be deployed to the computer-readable 
media of a computing device.  
Operating on-device during fingerprint authentication, the anti-spoof detection algorithm 
can: 1) extract a feature vector for the scattered images of enrolled fingerprints and verify 
fingerprints (e.g., fingerprints captured during authentication); and 2) compute a matching score 
between the enrolled and verify scattered images.  Provided the matching score exceeds an 
established threshold certainty, the computing device can authenticate the user; otherwise, a spoof 
fingerprint can be identified and rejected. 
Further to the above descriptions, color filters may be added above the optical fingerprint 
sensor such that the sensor can identify skin properties (e.g., skin color).  The anti-spoof detection 
algorithm can be additionally trained to compare skin properties of an enrolled finger image and a 
verify finger image.  In so doing, an additional level of security can be implemented in fingerprint 
authentication services. 
In summary, the addition of a quarter-wave polarizer above an optical fingerprint sensor, 
along with the utilization of an anti-spoof detection algorithm, can enable a computing device to 
distinguish a spoof fingerprint from an authentic fingerprint, and thereby increase the security and 
privacy of computing devices. 
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